Merchant signer

A hot wallet that pays out by itself, inside limits you set.

The seed stays inside a hardware enclave on your own server, and every payout is checked there before it is signed. Works with BTCPay Server.

Bitcoin test network

Whoever takes over the server takes the wallet.

A payment server’s hot wallet keeps its seed on the server, and the server software signs with it. Anyone who can act as that software can read the seed and sign any transaction: a stolen admin login, a malicious plugin, a bug in the web app.

The usual advice is a hardware wallet. But a hardware wallet needs a person for every payment, and payouts and sweeps don’t have one. Merchant signer is that advice made automatic.

How it works

There is no seed file.

The seed is generated inside the enclave and never leaves it in clear. Your payment server keeps a watch-only view, as with any cold wallet. The only other copy is an encrypted recovery file that opens with your offline recovery key.

The enclave judges every transaction.

Before it signs, it checks the transaction against your limits: which destinations are trusted, how much per transaction, how much per budget window, and the fee. Inside the limits it signs with nobody present. Outside them it refuses, whatever the server asks.

Limits change rarely, and never from the server.

You sign them with an owner key on a separate device. A tighter limit applies at once. A looser one waits a time lock, a day by default, and you can cancel it while it waits.

Budget windows run on Bitcoin’s clock.

A window is counted in blocks, not in the server’s hours, so a compromised server can’t reset the budget by changing the time.

If the worst happens

What happensA hot wallet on the serverMerchant signer
The admin login is stolenThe whole wallet is sweptAt most the budget of the current window. You freeze it, and the rest stays.
A malicious plugin runs inside the payment serverThe whole wallet is sweptThe same bound. A plugin can only ask the enclave.
Someone gets full control of the serverEverything the server can readThe seed stays out of reach. Replaying an old state needs a restart, and after a restart the enclave signs nothing until you approve it with your key.
Your owner device is stolenNot applicableThe thief can only request looser limits. They wait the time lock, and you cancel with the recovery key.
The server dies and the disk is lostThe seed is in a backup, or goneRestore from the encrypted recovery file into any standard wallet.

What it does not do

It does not protect money the limits allow to leave.

A thief who gets in through the payment server can take one window’s budget. Keep only a working float in the hot wallet and sweep the rest to cold storage; the sweep is one of your trusted destinations.

An unattended setup gives up one protection.

You can let the enclave start again by itself after a restart. That is convenient, and it removes the approval step that stops an old state from being replayed. With it, treat the whole float as exposed to someone who controls the server.

It does not change who administers the payment server.

An administrator can still point a store at a different wallet, so that future customer payments go elsewhere. That is the payment server’s own access control, the same as today.

Physical attacks on the processor are out of scope.

So are flaws in the processor’s own design. It needs a server whose processor supports attested hardware enclaves.

Where it runs today

On a Bitcoin test network, as a plugin for BTCPay Server with the signer beside it on the same machine. Your two keys, the owner key and the recovery key, never touch that machine.

It is for merchants and small projects that pay out automatically and run their own payment server.

Talk to us

info@postcryptum.io